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The internationalization of capital markets that occurred during the era of the 
classical gold standard (1870-1914) was part of a broader set of trends that 
threatened to drain local markets from capital and channel that capital to the 
national financial center and, from there, toward other national financial centers. 
Still, internationalization was neither inevitable, uniform, nor irreversible, but 
was a political choice informed by redistributional considerations between rival 
domestic interests and decided by politically dominant coalitions. The domestic 
institutional structure in each country determined the composition of the 
politically dominant coalition. Decentralized structures allowed potential losers 
to curb public policies favorable to capital market internationalization, whereas 
centralized structures allowed expected winners to promote such policies. As a 
result, economies with centralized states ended up being the most dependent on 
the international capital market, whereas economies with decentralized states 



























































































The internationalization of finance in recent years has brought the world 
economy to the level it had reached in 1913. With this has come a political 
debate about the vices and virtues of globalization and an analytic debate about 
its causes. This paper presents an analysis of the earlier period that highlights 
the importance of political choices in bringing about the internationalization of 
finance and stresses the variability of choice among countries experiencing the 
same global phenomenon.
One can hardly open a news magazine nowadays that does not feature an 
editorial warning against, or urging some kind of adjustment to, capital market 
globalization. Underlying this "global talk" are the beliefs that capital market 
internationalization is inevitable, uniform, and irreversible. The scientific 
debate shows more nuances, focusing mainly on the respective roles played by 
political and non-political factors. One group of scholars see capital 
internationalization originating in changes in technology or the international 
power system or both.1 They trace its distortionary impact on existing wealth 
distribution, with the relative immiseration of unskilled labor in the West and, 
more generally, of holders of immobile factors of production or sectors using 
these factors intensively.2 Some of them see internationalization as resulting in 
a weakening of state bureaucracies.3 Another group of scholars place the 
emphasis, instead, on state-borrowing preferences as the primary vehicle for 
global finance,4 on coordination among states as a facilitating mechanism,5 and 
on the mediating role of state institutions and resulting divergent policy 
responses.6
It is not the first time that cross-border capital flows grow out of ordinary 
proportions. A century ago, during the period of the gold standard, the world 
experienced levels of capital internationalization comparable, if not higher, than 
current ones. Yet hardly any of the most extreme predictions associated with 
today's occurrence were realized: internationalization was neither inevitable, 
uniform, nor notably successful—Britain and France, who embraced 
internationalization, grew more slowly than Germany and the United States, 
who accepted lower levels of capital market interdependence. And, of course, 
internationalization was reversed.
Two lessons can be drawn from the nineteenth-century stab at capital 
internationalization. First, internationalization was a political choice informed 
by redistributional considerations between rival domestic interests and decided 
by coalitions on which governments were dependent for support. The choice in 
favor of openness reflected the economic preferences of large commercial banks 



























































































countries, all of whom expected to benefit from openness. In contrast, the 
choice in favor of lesser capital interdependence reflected the preferences of 
sectors that were expected to lose from openness, including agriculture and 
sectors with a high density of small- and medium-sized firms.
Second, the domestic institutional structure in each country determined the 
identity of the politically dominant coalition. Decentralized structures allowed 
potential losers to curb public policies favorable to capital market 
internationalization, whereas centralized structures allowed expected winners to 
promote such policies. As a result, economies with centralized states ended up 
being the most dependent on the international capital market, whereas 
economies with decentralized states took a less active part in the globalization 
of finance.
The present inquiry into the functioning of turn-of-the-century capital markets 
innovates on two further counts. First, unlike most studies of
internationalization, the present study parts with comparative statics.7 As 
generally recognized, internationalization is a process that feeds on itself, 
calling for a dynamic model. Second, the present study modifies the standard 
approach to the redistributional effects of capital flows.8 Economic in its 
inspiration, the standard approach points to the cleavage between savers and 
non-savers, two politically inept groupings on account of size and diffusion. 
Yet concerns over the wealth effects of financial flows have not remained 
uniformly unvoiced. They were articulated in a majority of countries along 
another line of cleavage—the center-periphery cleavage—pitting each central 
government against its respective local governments.
The first part of the paper presents the theoretical framework, the second part 
the argument, and then the third part the evidence. The conclusion will 
summarize the findings and amplify the themes of this introduction.
I. THE MODEL
Internationalization has a dynamic, historical character: it feeds on itself. 
Although all studies of internationalization acknowledge this feature, they fail 
to draw the appropriate methodological consequence.
When inquiring into the origins of internationalization, all authors concur in 
listing two sets of determining factors: (1) technological innovations yielding 
reductions in cross-border transaction costs, and (2) government policies easing 
cross-border capital flows.9 Although technological innovations may, in some 




























































































unequivocally endogenous to the mechanism of internationalization. Causal 
models of the comparative statics type cannot supply the proper explanation; 
internationalization would be serving both as independent and dependent 
variable—an axiomatic non sequitur for this kind of model. That circularity must 
instead be explicitly tackled through a dynamic model.
The need for a dynamic approach is far from being universally shared. Studies 
of internationalization that seek to explain internationalization, instead, try to fit 
it into the Procrustean bed of comparative statics, with circularity being avoided 
in one of two ways: (1) technological determinism, which makes technological 
innovation exogenous and uses it to determine the model;10 and (2) structural 
determinism, which sees internationalization as the suboptimal outcome of 
states' competitive bidding for international capital.I 11 Technological 
determinism, however, goes against recent developments in "new growth" 
theory, making innovation a process that is endogenous to firms' profit- 
maximizing strategies, which states can influence through diverse policies.12 
With respect to the second claim, only the future will tell whether the 
deregulatory race between states for capital is structural or contingent on 
reversible domestic changes. The fact that the same countries already went 
through a similar race under the gold standard weakens considerably the claim 
that today's competition is there to stay.
A simple dynamic model features a two-period decision process, allowing for a 
change in the state of nature in between. In the first period, the government is 
confronted with a technological innovation that promises to ease 
internationalization in the second period if the regulatory status quo is left 
unchanged and if the innovation is allowed to move down its learning curve, 
that is, be adopted, diffused, and improved through learning by doing. The 
government decides on the basis of expected return and opportunity cost, taking 
into account what other countries might do, whether to check the innovation by 
means of countervailing policies or let it mature. If the innovation is aborted, 
then internationalization will not ensue, and the degree of openness will remain 
unchanged in the second period. If, instead, the innovation is allowed to mature, 
internationalization will proceed, and the degree of openness of the capital 
market will be higher in the second period than in the first.
I now amend the story to make space for coalitions and institutions. Assume
that the government decision is the outcome of a policy process in which the 
most organized interests get to impose their policy preferences. Private interests 
in the first period anticipate the future distributional effects of the initial 
innovation were it to run its course in the second period. Anticipated losers will 




























































































not they can organize depends on the nature of extant domestic institutions (or a 
subset thereof). To the extent that countries have different institutions, the 
degree of internationalization chosen by each government will differ, reflecting 
institutional variation.
One advantage of setting up the problem this way is not to confuse the 
outcome—the degree of openness to capital flows achieved by each country— 
with the cause—an exogenous innovation promising gains and losses tomorrow 
to interests that can anticipate its wealth effects and act accordingly now. 
Internationalization is not ordained in the present formulation, but unlikely to 
proceed very far if potential losers enjoy political power. Another advantage is 
to differentiate the initial technological innovation, which may be treated as 
exogenous to politics, from the price shock that will result from the widespread 
adoption of the innovation, which is endogenous.13 A possible drawback of the 
present formulation comes from its perhaps excessive simplicity; the process is 
reduced to only two periods with actors graced with the gift of perfect foresight. 
Reality may afford many more periods, with individuals and governments 
exhibiting a present foresight limited to the next period alone and a present 
latitude constrained by decisions made in the prior period. The two-stage set-up, 
however, with its perfect foresight implication, makes the presentation of the 
material clearer.
Applying this model to the case of capital market internationalization under the 
gold standard will require completing three successive steps: (1) extract from 
the late-nineteenth-century historical reality the exogenous technological 
changes that had the potential to increase cross-border investment in all 
countries; (2) derive the potential domestic losers from this innovation, assess 
their nonmarket options in light of their institutional power, and then derive 
each country's policy response; and (3) derive the predicted degree of openness 
to international capital flows that each country should have eventually reached 
according to the model. The next past of the paper presents the three-step 
argument, and the third part confronts it with the historical record. I.
II. THE ARGUMENT
Changes in Banking Technology and the Demand for Short Assets14
The surge in capital flows witnessed under the gold standard, I argue in this and 
the next two sections, originated in a demand for foreign investments, not 
merely long, as usually noted, but more importantly short. Banks in the late- 




























































































could supply. In this and the next sections I focus on the demand and supply 
side of short-term assets.
Banking until the mid-nineteenth century relied on personal connections. 
Bankers would borrow from and lend to individuals whom they knew well, 
either because they lived in the same towns or because borrowers and bank 
shareholders were often the same people—a relation that Naomi Lamoreaux has 
appropriately dubbed "insider lending."15 Philip Cottrell wrote of the English 
country banks:
Until the 1880s English country banks were products of the localities and regions that 
they served; customers and shareholders were frequently the same people. The bank's 
constituencies both owned the banks and did business with them. Directors and 
managers knew their customers well and with prudence and local knowledge were 
prepared to go beyond the bounds of short-term lending.16
Where local, personal connections were unavailing, banks would simply not 
lend to enterprises. Gustav Mevissen, a co-director of the Bank of Darmstadt, 
made the point with utmost clarity in an instruction to the bank management 
written at mid-century:
The task of our bank is not to attract the business of industrial and commercial 
enterprise in general. On the contrary, it will be our mission to establish contact with 
all government institutions, joint-stock companies, and wealthy private persons in the 
hope of obtaining as large a share of the business of governments, of princes and 
principates, as well as joint-stock companies and wealthy private persons as 
possible.17
By the middle of the century banking evolved into a more impersonal and 
professional activity under the pressure of two circumstances. The first 
circumstance was the rise in individual deposits and the simultaneous decline of 
bank equity and note issuing. Until mid-century, there were only two main ways 
of procuring capital in large quantity-note issuing, which in many countries 
already was, or about to become, regulated by government, and equity; deposits 
played a marginal role. By mid-century, however, the spread of industrialization 
led to a relative enlargement of the saving public and to a shift of the public's 
preferences from cash to checks (or credit transfers) for transaction purposes. 
Demand for deposit accounts, long and short, grew so much that it became 
thinkable for private bankers to finance lending with deposits taken from 
numerous individuals with whom they had no prior or other dealings. Banks 
saw in deposit-taking a way of improving profitability. Depositors typically 
earned less than bank shareholders; by increasing the share of deposits relative 




























































































nineteenth century thus saw in most countries a rush toward deposit banking. 
Leading in this new type of banking were the clearing banks in England and 
Wales, the Crédit Lyonnais in France, and the Deutsche Bank in Germany.
Deposits grew in the economy as a whole relative to gross national product 
(GNP) and in the banking sector relative to other banking resources.18 The 
rising importance of deposits created a liquidity problem for the banks for two 
reasons. First, deposits were short-term assets. Although banks tried to lengthen 
the maturity of deposits by creating term deposits, according to which early 
withdrawals carried penalties, they could never prevent depositors confronted 
with the danger of a bank run from cashing their savings rather than facing the 
risk of losing them all. Second, unlike stockholders, depositors had no insider 
information on the good management and solvency of the bank. They could not 
monitor the management nor draw a reliable assessment of the bank's solvency. 
They relied instead on rumor, with the result that banks were subject to 
"sunspot" panics, that is, runs on deposits with no other rationale than each 
depositor's fear of being the victim of other depositors' fear of runs. A run on a 
bank would trigger a run on other banks if it were believed that the collapse of 
the first bank would weaken the liquidity of the others, as was often the case.19
The liquidity problem arising from the generalization of deposits was 
compounded by another circumstantial change, taking the form of the 
progressive replacement of the bill of exchange by overdrafts.20 The substitution 
was caused by multiple separate changes, including the reduction in transport 
costs, changes in sale and payment practices (buyers paying cash to take 
advantage of discounts), the telegraphic transfer of payments, and firms relying 
on checks in general to effect payment.21 Overdrafts were better remunerated 
than bills, but they were easily renewed and thus less liquid. Unlike bills, 
moreover, advances could not be readily recycled through rediscounting at the 
central bank.
Relying on more volatile resources (deposits) to finance less liquid assets 
(overdrafts), banks were caught in a liquidity squeeze. They became aware of it 
in the wake of a string of banking crises, during which deposits were withdrawn 
in exchange for coin and central bank notes. Hence, Michael Collins notes that 
after each crisis in England and Wales, the most severe being the crash of the 
City of Glasgow Bank in 1878, the banks tended to maintain a higher 
proportion of very liquid assets.22 Jean Bouvier notes that the crash of 1882 in 
France served to disqualify loans to industry in the eyes of Henri Germain, the 




























































































The standard response to the liquidity crisis was for banks to move to a form of 
banking that was safer. This meant developing standard lending procedures and 
thus more interchangeable and negotiable instruments, which could be used as 
secondary forms of liquidity. But since standardization could more easily be 
achieved in short-term lending than in long-term lending, standardization 
amounted to shortening the maturity of most assets: commercial banks would 
abandon their initial universality, specializing instead in short-term lending.24 
Short, standardized assets had the advantage of being readily disposable in 
periods of crisis. But they had two drawbacks. First, they yielded lower profits. 
Second, safe paper was hard to find, especially now that overdrafts were 
displacing trade bills. In London, Paris, Milan, and Berlin, bankers complained 
about a persistent shortage in "good" paper, increasingly limited to international 
acceptances, that is, to bills generated by the settlement of international trade.25 
The important role played by good paper in the smooth functioning of the 
monetary market placed these international centers into competition for the 
naturalization of the market for acceptances.26 This shortage was also 
responsible for the revival of competition, noted in several countries, between 
the central bank and the deposit banks.27
The higher demand for good paper elicited new profit-making strategies- 
amalgamation, centralization, and internationalization. All three aimed at 
relieving the need for good paper through greater productivity and higher 
volume. Amalgamation allowed banks to take advantage of the internal scale 
economies released by the move toward standardization. It is important to note 
that no such economies of scale existed during the first half of the century, 
when banking was still a matter of personal connections and when profits 
sanctioned investments in high-yield, low-volume loans to local industries. 
Only after banks had been forced to abandon their long-term positions in local 
firms and to compensate for low yield through high volume did amalgamation 
become a profitable strategy. Amalgamation reduced bank capital requirements, 
improving earning potential. Amalgamation also allowed merging banks to 
rationalize their asset portfolio, taking over the best paper held by their 
competitors and liquidating less desirable items.28
Amalgamation naturally led to centralization-the relocation of bank 
headquarters in financial centers. Centralization allowed banks to capture 
external scale economies: central clearing allowed banks to economize on 
working balances, and the greater breadth of the market increased the liquidity 
of security issues.29 Moreover, centralization allowed banks to enter lucrative 
lines of activity, such as the underwriting of government and railroad loans. 




























































































loans figured those to foreign governments, until then the exclusive province of 
prestigious private banking houses.30
In sum, the liquidity squeeze that characterized commercial banking during the 
second half of the nineteenth century created a demand for short assets and led 
banks to pursue a profit-making strategy geared to the capture of a larger share 
of the relatively diminishing supply of short assets.
The Gold Standard and the Supply of Short Assets
The gold standard gave a boost to international capital markets, making possible 
an absolute increase in the coveted short instruments. It did so directly, though 
to a small extent, by assisting the market for acceptances, and indirectly, yet to a 
greater extent, by giving a boost to long-term credits.
The gold standard first assisted the market for short-term capital, that of 
international acceptances, by reducing the currency risk. We do not know to 
what extent. Surely, the currency risk was already low under preceding 
bimetallism. Moreover, the market for international acceptances was, from 1870 
on, monopolized by London; international acceptances did play substitute for 
vanishing bills of exchange in Britain, but not elsewhere. The greatest 
contribution to the uniform supply of short assets across financial centers, I 
believe, was more indirect; it was a spin-off of the boom in long-term foreign 
investment. I first develop the impact of the gold standard on long-term foreign 
investment and then its related effects on banks’ short assets.
The gold standard stimulated the long-term financial market. Operating as a 
commitment rule, according to which gold countries pledged to maintain a fixed 
parity between one unit of their currency and a given quantity of gold, the gold 
standard made possible the systematic transfer of capital from capital-rich and 
slow-growing economies to capital-poor and fast-growing economies.31 
Countries seeking long-term foreign capital paid lower interest rates on loans 
contracted in London, Paris, Berlin and other financial centers if they adhered to 
the gold standard.32 In the Russian and Austrian empires, partisans of 
industrialization thought that industrialization could be a speedy process if 
foreign capital intervened to stimulate it; foreign capital would come by going 
on gold.33 Reflecting on the experience of Spain, which suspended gold 
convertibility in 1883, Pablo Martin-Acena argued that, by staying out of the 
gold standard, "Spain missed on growth."34 Npt only did imports of foreign 
capital cease from 1883 until 1906, when a new administration finally opted for 
a return to gold, but yields on the public debt were "consistently maintained 




























































































The generalization of the gold standard coincided with a rise in international 
capital outflows to levels that were never approached before and have never 
been approached since. Bairoch's estimates for capital flows for all net creditor 
countries show a slowdown in the depression decades of the gold standard, 
followed by an unprecedented surge after 1900:
1840-1870: 2.5-3.5 percent GNP 
1870-1900: 1.5-2.0 percent GNP 
1900-1913: 5.5 percent GNP.36
Comparable data for the 1920s, 1960s, and 1970s were below 1 percent.
Most of this investment, about three-fourths, came from three countries (United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany), which were running persistent current 
account surpluses by generating savings in excess of domestic investment. 
Relative to total domestic savings, net capital outflows in 1910 represented 52 
percent for the United Kingdom and 15 percent for France.37 The rest was 
contributed by the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and, toward the end of 
the period, Sweden. Most of this investment went to a few countries—the United 
States, Canada, Australasia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Spain, Portugal, 
Italy, Austria-Hungary, and the Scandinavian countries.38
What made foreign investment so popular among savers in Britain, France, 
Germany, and other creditor countries was its greater safety, at equivalent yield, 
than domestic paper. In the case of Britain, Michael Edelstein found that 
overseas returns exceeded home returns over the years 1870-1913; he also 
found that overseas returns were not significantly riskier than domestic returns, 
but in fact tended to be less so.39 The greater safety of foreign investments 
relative to home investments is easily explained; it derived from the nature of 
these investments, which, according to Arthur Bloomfield, "depended directly 
or indirectly on government action."40 Loans either went to foreign governments 
(Russia and countries in central and southern Europe), or, even when loans went 
to private companies, as in the case of railroad construction and other public 
investments (utilities, roads, bridges, harbors, telegraph and telephone 
networks), they were made possible by government assistance in the form of 
guarantees, land loans, and cash grants. Finally, the bulk of this investment was 
portfolio; a generous estimate places the relative share of direct investment of 
the total long-term international debt in 1914 at only 35 percent.41
The higher yield of foreign over domestic investments holding risk constant, 
albeit empirically established, is more difficult to explain. Edelstein offered two 




























































































valid in the case of the United States, views foreign returns constantly running 
ahead of expectations: "Overseas regions had a tendency to generate greater 
amounts of profitable innovations and new market opportunities, periodically 
fostering greater disequilibria, which in turn left their mark on realized returns." 
A second hypothesis looks for higher returns in market imperfection: "Overseas 
areas evinced a tendency to generate more circumstances involving imperfect 
competition and, possibly, greater monopoly rents." The active role played by 
host governments in attracting foreign capital predictably was a consequential 
source of monopoly rents.
A third hypothesis, I venture, was the relative backwardness of receiving 
countries. With the exception of the Netherlands, creditor countries (Britain, 
France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland) were generally more advanced 
industrially than debtor countries. The differential timing of industrialization 
triggered a product-cycle effect: high-growth sectors in debtor countries were 
already stable- (or low-) growth sectors in creditor countries. Although yields 
on new ventures may have been the same, risks were lower in newly 
industrializing economies. In contrast, investing in an advanced economy meant 
putting one's money into new ventures with untested rates of return.
The boom in long-term flows would supply banks with the short assets they 
were so desperately looking for in two ways. First, the joint-stock commercial 
banks on the continent, and later in Britain, took over the floating and 
placement of long-term bonds. Although these bonds were nominally long term, 
and banks standardly held onto such bonds no longer than it took to place them 
among their clienteles, the safety and trading volume of these instruments made 
them easily disposable assets, easily convertible into cash, and thus de facto 
substitutes for short-term paper.
Second, commercial banks would float a government or government-guaranteed 
long-term bond issue provided that they be given a share in the more lucrative 
short-term debt issued by these same governments. The volume of a short-term 
government paper depended a lot, in the end, on the popularity of its equivalent 
long-term debt, since the usual way of repaying the short-term debt was to 
consolidate it into long-term debt. The more savers would purchase bonds 
issued by foreign governments, the more bankers would consent advances to 
foreign governments. Short-term government debt was usually safer than its 
long-term equivalent, since no treasury, even if compelled to default on its long­





























































































By taking a part in long-term foreign government investment, joint-stock banks 
thereby gained access in proportional amount to a supply of short-term 
government debt, which, unlike the market for acceptances, could not be 
monopolized by London. It could not be monopolized by The City because of 
the implicit links just mentioned between long and short government debt 
imposed by bankers, and because long-term debt, unlike short-term debt, 
exhibited fewer scale economies. London bankers largely financed world short­
term transactions by the positive current accounts held by traders in London, 
with the result that any increase in world trade spontaneously yielded an 
equivalent increase in bank resources. Long-term lending, in contrast, was 
financed by savings, making the size of domestic savings accumulated in any 
specific country a constraint on how much the banks in that country could lend. 
The reasoning applies to both creditor and debtor countries. Loans were floated 
by international syndicates of bankers, including banks from both debtor and 
creditor countries. The bonds would be issued both in the lending and the 
borrowing country. Moreover, there was a tendency over time for government 
bonds and good railway securities issued in Berlin, Paris, or London to return to 
domestic investors, who held them as chief long-term saving instruments, 
earning interests in marks, francs, or sterling. As a result, English, French, 
German, Dutch, Belgian, and Danish government securities were entirely held 
at home by the mid-1870s; Austrian and Hungarian investors owned two-thirds 
of their own state debt; U.S. government securities were almost entirely taken 
and held at home.43
In sum, the gold standard supplied financial centers with a high volume of 
instruments, more liquid, yet no less rewarding, than domestic instruments. 
Although investors in foreign securities faced an additional currency risk, the 
function of the gold standard was to nullify that risk.
The Redistributional Challenge: Specialization, Centralization, and
Internationalization of Capital Markets
The two preceding sections together point to two sets of changes that would 
challenge traditional ways of banking. On the domestic front, first, the deposits 
revolution precipitated a demand for "shorter" assets. The decline of the bill of 
exchange, by deteriorating the liquidity of commercial banks, forced banks to 
abandon the intermediation of unsafe industrial paper and specialize instead 
into the intermediation of shorter paper. On the international front, 
simultaneously, the gold standard enabled the expansion of a global market for 
short government paper with the potential to supply new depositors' and banks’ 




























































































Although the need for clarity somewhat forced the argument into a causal, 
linear, and perhaps excessively deterministic mode, it is important to appreciate 
that the "push" exerted by the technological changes happening in mid­
nineteenth-century banking structures was supplemented by the "pull" of 
internationalization. Market players do not ride structural changes blindly; they 
make them happen by anticipating future payoffs and choosing profit- 
maximizing strategies through backward induction. Had the demand for short 
assets found no supply, savers and banks would have had to be content with 
existing long-term opportunities; deposits may not have grown as fast, nor may 
have banks found amalgamation a solution to illiquidity.
This mutually reinforcing dynamic upset established ways of banking. Bank 
specialization in short loans threatened the estrangement of bank and industry, 
the latter being left to its own means and to the security market for the provision 
of long-term capital. The same specialization also threatened a centralization of 
domestic capital markets through the concentration of banking around a handful 
of gigantic, tentacular banks, draining local savings to the financial center and 
investing its proceeds into government and foreign securities. An increase in the 
trading of foreign assets threatened the internationalization of capital markets 
and a greater dependence on external events.
Specialization, centralization, and internationalization of banking occurred in 
Britain and France. We also know that many other countries experienced an 
evolution quite different from that of Britain and France. The fact is that there 
was more than the British or French ways of responding to this challenge, and 
that each country chose the way that best suited its institutional setting. To this 
differential response we will turn once we have identified the micro wealth 
effects of late-nineteenth-century globalization.
Potential Winners and Losers
The challenge that we have so far identified—the specialization, centralization, 
and internationalization of banking—is "macro"; yet politics, as we know, is 
mediated by individuals, who join producer groups—sector, class, or locale—to 
press their individual preferences on their respective government. To be able to 
account for a government's response to the broad challenge thus identified, that 
challenge needs to be made relevant to individuals' welfare; the challenge must 
be disaggregated and its potential wealth effects mapped.44
The surge in capital flows across borders would have, within each nation, two 
intersecting distributional consequences: (1) between savers and borrowers, and 




























































































accordance with standard Heckscher-Ohlin premises, would pit borrowers 
against savers. Domestic savers in creditor countries would be better off, for 
they would be offered a wider and better array of investment opportunities. In 
contrast, local borrowers of capital, who were dependent on external finance, 
would be relatively worse off, for they would be in competition with foreign 
borrowers to attract capital and thus pressed to remunerate it better. The 
situation was the exact reverse in debtor countries. Moving to the gold standard 
would hurt local savers, since they would be competing with foreign savers for 
a given demand for capital, whereas local borrowers would benefit from it.
The second cleavage was the center-periphery cleavage, running in each 
country between the financial center and local industrial and agrarian districts. I 
pointed earlier to a twofold trend toward greater centralization of the banking 
sector and greater liquidity through shorter lending. A likely consequence 
would be the estrangement of bank and industry: banks avoiding any form of 
industrial paper as unsafe. Although this is the conclusion that some historians 
of British and French capital markets have reached, the picture needs to be 
refined.45
Lamoreaux provides an interesting typology of how a firm's need for bank loans 
changes through its life cyle. Drawing from notions that are now common in 
information economics as applied to industrial organization, she argues that,
as firms grow and mature their sources o f funding should change ... 
because as firms become better established, more information is 
available about them, and as a result they can take advantage o f cheaper 
techniques for tapping outside pools o f savings.46
Start-ups have to rely essentially on internal funding-the wealth of their 
founders. In contrast, firms with a well-established track record can rely for 
external funding on the equity markets. It is between these two stages, when the 
firm is too large to expand on the sole basis of internal funding, yet still too 
small to enable individual investors to evaluate its earning potential with a 
modicum of confidence, that firms need bank assistance. Quoting from 
Lamoreaux again,
Because collecting information about firms in this [intermediate] stage is 
too costly for investors to take on individually, this function must be 
performed by intermediaries, such as banks, whose responsibility is to 
serve as "delegated monitors"-that is, to collect information about and 




























































































Banks can perform the function of "delegated monitor"-and purveyor of long­
term capital to the maturing firm-provided that two conditions are 
simultaneously realized. The first condition is that bank and firm be close 
enough, physically, for the bank to monitor the firm. Physical presence may be 
had through geographic proximity and common membership in local networks 
that function on social control and reputation. The condition is well-known in 
cooperative banking in which local, unsecured projects receive funding at very 
reasonable rates only because the members of the cooperatives know the 
borrower personally.48 Physical presence can also be realized by the presence of 
the banker on the board of directors of the funded company—a widespread 
practice among European universal banks.49 Through geographic proximity or 
board membership, a bank can monitor a firm's performance adequately and 
grant it external funding accordingly.
A second condition for effective bank monitoring and purveying of long-term 
capital is, of course, the bank's willingness to lend long. A banker should be 
disposed to see the short-term credits granted to firms renewed and consolidated 
into de facto long-term advances should these firms experience temporary cash­
flow problems or have a need for expansion or modernization.
The two conditions for effective bank monitoring—physical presence and long­
term lending—would be difficult to realize were the previously analyzed trends 
in capital markets to proceed unbridled. The trend toward centralization made 
local banking more difficult, for local branch directors could not be trusted to 
enforce the lending preferences of their bank headquarters. The trend toward 
concentration made monitoring through physical presence at board meetings 
impractical for the small- and medium-sized firms, for bankers were able to 
attend only so many board meetings in a year, preferably those of the largest 
companies. Finally, the liquidity crises experienced by banks made them less 
willing to immobilize their resources in industry.
A lesser capacity by banks to monitor firms would compel banks to refrain from 
lending to small- and medium-sized firms. Too large to rely on internal funding, 
yet not large enough to raise external capital on the equity markets, these firms 
would be unable to build up their long-term capital. The centralization of capital 
markets threatened to thin the ranks of small- and medium-sized firms.
More generally, centralization threatened to depress the industrial vitality of 
regions with a concentration of small- and medium-sized firms. Recent research 
on flexible specialization points to the existence in nineteenth-century Europe 
of what Alfred Marshall called "industrial districts"—regional production 




























































































Vaud and Neuchatel (watch-making), and Bologna (metalworking), based 
exclusively on small- and medium-sized firms.50 Industrial districts were 
networks of small enterprises working together to serve differentiated and 
volatile international markets with quality, specialty products. Product 
flexibility disqualified internal scale economies, thriving instead on the external 
scale economies generated by the agglomeration of versatile, low-capitalized 
firms, spreading risk among one another. Firms in industrial districts used a 
skilled workforce and relied on local municipalities, guilds, and trade 
associations to supply them with the necessary externalities—vocational 
training, price and wage regulation, marketing facilities, quality normalization, 
and, more importantly to the present study, access to capital. Capital for 
industrial districts was provided by local banks—private and savings—and credit 
cooperatives. All countries had, by 1850, a high concentration of industrial 
districts; large, vertically-integrated production serving mass markets was still 
embryonic. The centralization of capital markets under the two-pronged impact 
of bank amalgamation and market globalization threatened to dry up one of the 
key inputs to production in industrial districts—access to capital. The 
foreseeable monopolizing of deposit-taking by a handful of risk-averse, center- 
located banks, each at the head of a countrywide network of branch offices, 
threatened to drain local districts from individual savings and channel it instead 
into national and foreign government-backed paper. Changes in capital markets 
caused a tension between center and periphery.
While the reasoning so far has borne on creditor countries, that is, countries 
with spare money to invest abroad, the draining of peripheral capital was as 
likely to affect debtor countries, countries with an investment demand in excess 
of domestic savings. Not all local borrowers in debtor countries could benefit 
from the infusion of foreign capital. As already mentioned, foreign capital had a 
preference for safety. Foreign capital also had a preference, all else equal, for 
large, visible investments, easier to monitor from afar than small, unreported 
ones. The preference for safety and the steeper monitoring costs faced by 
foreign savers therefore tended to divide local investors into two groups: the 
state-sponsored, large investors, who would get access to the foreign manna, 
and the small, unsponsored investors, who would be bypassed.
Not only would small and medium-sized firms in debtor countries be unlikely to 
receive foreign investment, but they were in danger of losing their privileged 
access to local capital as well. Foreign capital had a seeding effect; the effect of 
an initial infusion, in Platt's words, was "to stimulate domestic finance, to 
supply domestic savings with the confidence and familiarity that capitalists 
required for new forms of investment."51 Since this demonstration effect 




























































































attraction on peripheral capital until then vested in local projects. Local, 
decentralized districts might lose from local savers' greater awareness of new 
investment opportunities in their own country. The joint stock banks threatened 
to drain peripheral capital irrespective of the debtor or creditor status of the 
country.
A caveat is in order. Not all peripheral districts would necessarily suffer from 
the centralization and globalization of capital markets. Those districts that 
accommodated the rise of large, vertically-integrated, "autarkic" (in Gary 
Herrigel's terminology) firms, which were large enough to efficiently tap equity 
markets, would not necessarily be harmed by the decline of local, industrial 
banking, because the rise of large industry would compensate for the decline in 
craft-oriented sectors.52 One would expect these districts and the firms to which 
they were home to espouse the cause of centralization or, at least, be conflicted- 
-indeed, although the large firm provided local employment, its interest in the 
welfare of its local host was circumstantial and reversible.
Table 1 summarizes the mapping of the potential distortionary effects of the 
centralization and extroversion of capital markets under the gold standard. In 
creditor countries, the expected winners were the savers and the center banks; 
the expected losers were the industrial districts, with their fabric of small- and 
medium-sized firms, local banks, and local governments and farmers in general. 
Large firms were unaffected and thus indifferent. In debtor countries, the 
potential winners were the center banks and all firms either benefiting from the 
state guarantee on their debt or enjoying sufficient international visibility on 
their own to attract foreign investments; the potential losers were the savers and 
the industrial and farm districts.
[ Table 1 ]
The Losers' Nonmarket Options
The potential losers were not necessarily condemned but could try to resist the 
drain of local capital to the center. They could appeal to the politicians and 
press upon them the desirability of protecting local capital markets. Whether 
potential losers had any chance in obtaining compensation through politics was 
contingent on two conditions. Success depended first on their capacity to act 
collectively, a capacity constrained by size and dispersion.53 Seeking redress at 
the national level, therefore, was quite impractical; savers were disqualified on 
account of size and dispersion, whereas industrial districts were too scattered to 
coordinate their action at the national level. Collective action was more 




























































































firms, banks, crafts, and local business and labor organizations constituting the 
industrial district. It was true to a lesser extent of savers, who, through the 
channel of their savings banks, these quintessentially local monopolies, could 
reach the ear of their respective local governments.
The success of the potential losers' cause also depended on their relative 
political power, that is, given their exclusive reliance on local governments, on 
local governments' power. The power of local governments had two related 
dimensions. Power first meant regulatory power, that is, the extent to which 
local governments could interfere with capital flows on their own, free from 
state supervision. Power also meant political power, that is, the power that local 
governments had, acting together, to block the central state from claiming 
greater regulatory power at the detriment of local regulators or to even force the 
state to modify extant regulation in favor of local interests. Local governments 
could thus be used as conduit to the national level when local governments 
enjoyed some kind of constitutional representation, usually in the form of an 
upper chamber.
Local regulatory power and overall political power were linked. Absent overall 
political power, local governments enjoyed little local regulatory power. This 
was especially true in the context of capital market regulation. Capital markets 
have at all times interested governments, local and central. Being the largest 
capital borrowers, central state treasuries have always stood ready to manipulate 
capital markets to their benefit and to the extent of the regulatory power that 
they have enjoyed. The extent of this regulatory power, understandably, 
depended on the presence of other potential borrowers and their respective 
power. The most consistent opponents to central treasuries’ efforts to widen the 
circulation of state debt were local governments, who sought to retain local 
capital, for their own use and for local investment.
Levels of centralization were—and still are-not uniform across countries. 
Synthesizing different strands of macro-history, Stein Rokkan drew the 
following map of eighteenth-century Europe: at the center were the states 
located on the old trade-belt (stretching from Italy, crossing Switzerland, 
running along the Rhine toward the Low Countries, and then on to Scandinavia 
and the Hansean cities).54 The high density of cities characteristic of this area 
made it impossible for centralized states to take root. Major state building, 
instead, took place on either side of the trade belt (Sweden, Austria, Prussia, 
and Russia in the East, Britain, France, and Spain in the West), albeit with 
greater strength in the West. In the West the greater surge of commercial 
activity made it possible for center builders to extract resources easily 




























































































strong peripheries (Basque, Catalonian, and Galician). In the East, by contrast, 
the cities were much weaker; the only alternative partners for state builders 
were the owners of land, and the only resources that they could offer were not 
monetary, but food and manpower.55 Political centralization in the East 
precariously rested on economic (and cultural) parochialisms and did not 
survive the new demands for nationalist autonomy and democratization.
Meant for the eighteenth century, Rokkan's typology needs to be updated to the 
nineteenth century. There is the need, first, to include a third category—"federal 
democracy." Political power was quite decentralized in Switzerland and the 
United States. They were federal states, in which peripheral governments 
enjoyed considerable formal powers over their respective areas. Together, 
Switzerland and the United States [federal democracies) form the lower end of 
a centralization continuum showing Britain, France (centralized states) at the 
top and all the other countries so far mentioned (semicentralized states) 
somewhere in the middle. Second, the French occupation of Spain and the Low 
Countries had a lasting centralizing effect, moving Spain, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands close to France and Britain.
Third, each dominion found itself in a category that was unique and changing 
over time. Despite their common colonial origins, the dominions took different 
paths. Canada had a strong central state initially, a legacy of a colonial 
administration that was essentially a military apparatus. Only over time did the 
confederal structure work in the opposite direction to accommodate regional 
and linguistic diversity. Australasia, in contrast, was a set of seven dominions, 
arranging into two countries in 1901; New Zealand, which refused to join the 
Australian Commonwealth and thus remained a centralized state, and the six 
other states, which joined the Australian Commonwealth, a loose federation.
The degree of state centralization determined the distribution of regulatory 
powers between center and peripheral governments in financial matters. By 
1870, when the story of the gold standard begins, center and periphery 
governments had already carved up the market for savings according to their 
relative power. Even though savings banks were nonprofit organizations, 
initially created by philanthropic individuals or local governments to instill the 
saving habit among the urban poor, very soon they were seen by public officials 
as important purchasers of public debt, for whose demand central and local 
governments were in competition. In centralized states, the central government 
took over the regulation of savings; local sayings banks were displaced by 
postal savings in Britain55 and were regulated by the central government in 




























































































contrast, the savings banks became the chasses gardées of fiscally strained local 
governments.58
By mid-century, local governments were excluded from the capital market in 
centralized countries; they controlled the nonprofit segment in semicentralized 
countries; and they regulated almost all local banking (profit and nonprofit) in 
federal systems. Moreover, because the distribution of regulatory authority 
between center and local governments was a reflection of their respective 
overall power, this distribution had some lasting power. The case of Canada 
was already settled in favor of central government regulation, like Britain, while 
Australasia was still financially barren.
From the political institutions we can derive the power of those who were slated 
to lose from the centralization and internationalization of capital markets. In 
centralized countries, where local governments enjoyed no regulatory power 
and had no power to force the central government to interfere with market 
dynamics, potential losers had no possible recourse. In contrast, in both 
semicentralized countries and federal democracies, where local governments 
already enjoyed regulatory power over, in semicentralized countries, nonprofit 
banks and, in federal democracies, local banks at large, potential losers had the 
power to use local governments to defend local districts from the threat of 
capital drain. We now look at the policy instruments that were at the disposal of 
the potential losers and their hypothesized consequences on cross-border capital 
flows.
Policy Responses and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Hypotheses
Several sets of testable consequences follow from the present argument. 
Concerning each country's policy response to the triple challenge of banking 
specialization, centralization, and internationalization, first, governments in 
centralized states would do nothing and allow current trends to unfold 
unhindered. The upshot would be a capital market controlled by a handful of 
banks, draining peripheral deposits through countrywide branch networks. In 
semicentralized states, in contrast, the legislation would strengthen the 
nonprofit banking sector by means of subsidies to local savings banks and 
credit cooperatives (in the form of state guarantee and tax privilege) and the 
regulation of rate competition between these and the joint stock banks. The 
survival and parallel growth of local banks would help ensure the supply of 
capital to small- and medium-sized firms and the survival of industrial districts. 
In addition, in the case of debtor countries, the subsidization of savings banks 




























































































to what they could get from the commercial banks, which, under the gold 
standard, would be paying a world rate adjusted for local conditions.
In decentralized, federal states, local governments would counter the 
centralizing effects of capital globalization by protecting local commercial (and 
nonprofit) banks. Several policies could achieve this goal. The prohibition or 
limitation of branch banking would limit entry by the large, center banks, 
protect local banking expertise, and stabilize monitoring costs on lending. If 
note-issuing banks were linked to local governments, as they were in 
Switzerland until 1905, the continuation of free banking would make resources 
available to local governments and thus to local industrial districts. In sum, the 
more centralized the state, the more centralized the capital market, whereas the 
more decentralized the state, the more fragmented the capital market.
A second set of hypotheses bears on the degree of globalization of the domestic 
capital market. Dependence on cross-border capital flows was inversely 
correlated with the fragmentation of the domestic capital market. In creditor 
countries, fragmentation meant that a smaller share of the pool of national 
savings was available for foreign investment. The existence of vigorous local 
banking facilities had the effect of de facto "nationalizing" ("localizing" rather) 
local savings. Conversely, centralization made the entire savings pool available 
for investment abroad. In debtor countries, fragmentation meant that a smaller 
share of investment opportunities was open to foreign investment. Most 
investments in the periphery, those that were financed by savings banks, credit 
cooperatives, or local commercial banks, were off limits, because the presence 
of local capital reduced the need for foreign capital, and also because these local 
banks and firms were unable to attract foreign capital. Centralization, in 
contrast, opened the entire capital market to foreign investment. Therefore, in 
both creditor and debtor countries, fragmentation implied that a smaller share of 
the economy was to be internationalized. Fragmentation hindered international 
interdependence, whereas centralization made it easier.59 I.
III. THE EVIDENCE
Market Fragmentation Versus Centralization
The first hypothesis makes the centralization of the capital market a function of 
political centralization. This correlation was observed with respect to the 
banking policies adopted in each country first. Country analyses show that the 
centralized countries (Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, and 




























































































federal union) sanctioned the growth of center banks at the expense of local and 
nonprofit banking sectors;60 that semicentralized countries (Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, and Italy) protected the nonprofit banking sector;6' 
and that the federal democracies protected local commercial banks, through 
restrictions of branching in the United States and the subsidizing of cantonal 
banks in Switzerland.62 Norway pursued both the nonprofit and the ban-on- 
branching policies.63
These various policy responses, which space constraints do not allow me to 
detail here, would lead to radical-and more easily quantifiable-differences in 
capital market profiles across countries. By 1913, the political protection of 
local and nonprofit banking in federal and semicentralized states had 
considerably fragmented the fast-growing market for individual deposits. 
Whereas between 0 and 5 percent of the deposit market went to local savings 
banks and mutual credit societies in Britain, Belgium, France, Canada, and New 
Zealand, equivalent figures were above 50 percent in Denmark, Germany, 
Austria, and Norway, 40 percent in Italy, 35 percent in Sweden, and 18 percent 
in the Netherlands (Table 2). Although equivalent data for Switzerland and the 
United States were, respectively, 27 and 21 percent, they came on top of the 
market share held by local profit banks—the local and canton banks in 
Switzerland and the state-chartered banks in the United States—evaluated at 51 
and 39 percent, respectively, bringing Switzerland to a whopping 79 percent 
and the United States to 60 percent. The data for Australia are misleading, 
reflecting the union of its six member states in 1901. Each state had managed to 
establish a large savings bank to hold and place its railways bonds; these 
savings banks, which would be coded as "nonprofit, state" banks until 1901 
(like French and Belgian savings banks), are coded as "nonprofit, private" 
banks after 1901 (like German, Austrian, Italian, and Scandinavian savings 
banks). Clearly, Britain, France, Belgium, and the dominions (Australia 
excepted) had by 1913 a centralized deposit market, whereas the other states did 
not, allowing instead peripheral governments to split the lion's share.
[ Table 2 ]
A second measure of fragmentation is the importance of unit banking. Unit 
banking is a system in which banks are not allowed to establish branches 
outside of the area where they are headquartered. Although legally barred from 
branching out in only two countries, Norway and the United States, center 
banks had difficulties penetrating peripheral markets in all other federal and 
semicentralized countries as well. Rather than open branches, they relied on 
correspondents to bank with the periphery. Unit banking was important in the 




























































































France, and the dominions, in contrast, joint-stock banks weaved nationwide 
branch networks. Table 3 shows a 1929 measure of unit banking—a ratio with, 
as numerator, the number of commercial banks, and, as denominator, the 
number of commercial banks and branches.64
[ Table 3 ]
As one would expect, the two measures of fragmentation—local banking and 
unit banking—are correlated (Pearson = 0.62). Both measures should likewise be 
inversely correlated with the degree of political centralization achieved in each 
country. The hypothesis is tested in Table 4. The independent variable, political 
centralization, is proxied by its tax component—the proportion of national taxes 
going to the central government in circa 1880.65 The dependent variable, 
banking centralization, is alternatively measured by the 1913 deposit share of 
the local banks (measured by the share of deposits held by the nonprofit, non­
state banking sector in addition to local commercial banks in the federal 
democracies) and the 1929 indicator of unit banking. A proxy for the dominions 
is added on the right-hand side of the regression equation to account for the fact 
that the centralization of the banking systems found in the dominions had 
perhaps more to do with their prior colonial status than with their respective 
degrees of centralization in 1880; the fact that they all showed a high degree of 
banking centralization despite wide variations in tax centralization (high in 
Canada and New Zealand, low in Australia) would tend to confirm this 
conjecture.66 The findings, reported in Table 4, confirm the predictions. The 
coefficients for the tax proxy are correctly signed and statistically significant 
when tested against the null hypothesis.67
[ Table 4 ]
Degree of Dependence on Cross-Border Flows
Table 5 provides two values of long-term foreign investment stocks-the first, 
weighted per capita, the second, by unit of GNP. Capital flows were not evenly 
distributed across economies. British, Swiss, French, and Dutch savers held a 
greater proportion of foreign assets than their German and Belgian counterparts, 
whereas Canadian and Australian borrowers were more leveraged abroad than 
their Austrian, Italian, and U.S. equivalents. This dependence on the 
international capital market was not a function of size-smaller economies were 
not more dependent on international capital markets than larger ones (see Graph 
l).68 Dependence on the international capital market was a function of 
industrialization only to the extent that most industrially advanced countries 




























































































capital while most backward countries (Italy, Norway, Spain, Canada, Australia, 
Austria-Hungary) did import capital, but the intensity with which each country 
did so was not a function of relative industrialization (see Graph 2). Moreover, 
there were two exceptions to the regularity just mentioned: the United States, 
the world's most industrialized country in 1913, was still a net debtor, whereas 
the Netherlands, despite late industrialization, was a net creditor.69
[ Table 5, Graph 1, Graph 2 ]
The key to cross-national variations in levels of dependence on foreign capital 
flows—whether in or out—reached by each country, I claim, should be sought in 
the degree of centralization of the domestic capital market—and thus of political 
centralization. Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium should score high 
as centralized creditors; Canada, Australia, and New Zealand should score high 
as centralized debtors. All other countries should score relatively low.
The dependent variable is the stock of foreign investment held in 1914 divided 
by GNP. I used absolute values, so as to measure the relative dependence of the 
economy on foreign investment in and out, without distinction between debtor 
and creditor status. The independent variables alternatively are the degrees of 
centralization of political institutions and financial markets (found to be 
correlated in Table 4). Three specifications of centralization are tested: (1) the 
degree of fragmentation of the domestic capital market in 1913, measured by 
the proportion of deposits held by local and nonprofit banks; (2) the same 
degree of fragmentation, measured by the unit-banking ratio; and (3) the tax 
proxy for state centralization, along with a proxy for the dominions for the same 
reasons as those given in the discussion of Table 4.
The results are reported in Table 6. Switzerland is an outlyer across 
specifications-a finding for which I am unable to offer any explanation.70 
Regressions II to IV exclude the Swiss case. Graphs 3 and 4 visualize 
regressions I and IV (with Switzerland added), respectively. The expected 
patterns are correctly signed and statistically significant. Controlling for size 
and stage of industrialization does not significantly modify the results except in 
the case of specification III, using the unit-banking ratio, which drops below 
standard levels of significance (results unreported).





























































































The gold standard revolutionized domestic and international capital markets. 
Along with changes in banking instruments, such as the rise of deposits on the 
liability side and that of overdrafts on the asset side, the gold standard brought 
financial centers closer to one another, while taking each financial center farther 
away from its own periphery. These changes had distinct distributional effects; 
they favored center banks in all countries and large firms in debtor countries, 
while harming agrarians and small- and medium-sized firms in all countries and 
savers in debtor countries.
The surge in global finance, however, was not inevitable. Although triggered by 
changes of an exogenous nature, the surge in cross-border foreign investments 
would have never reached these unprecedented—and still unmatched—levels had 
it not found fertile ground in domestic institutions. The existence of a handful 
of countries with centralized political institutions, in which the government 
could ignore the ply of the potential losers—local districts of small farms and 
firms-without incurring political retribution, provided the international 
financial system with its largest suppliers (Britain, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands) and demanders (Canada, Australasia) of foreign capital.
The surge in global finance was not uniform either. Decentralized countries, in 
which the potential losers could avail themselves of the regulatory and political 
power enjoyed by local governments, did not embrace global finance, at least 
not to the same extent. In those countries governments passed policies that had 
the effect of fragmenting the domestic capital market and preventing the drain 
of peripheries from local savings. Nor was the centralized countries' new 
dependence on foreign capital markets irreversible. The outbreak of World War 
I pricked the global bubble, leaving those countries that were the most vested 
abroad with high losses and condemning those that were the most dependent on 
foreign capital to finance their debt to difficult fiscal choices.
Although there are limits to how much one can learn from the past, a few 
aspects of global finance in the golden age seem relevant to the present. First, 
the often-noted sympathy between sub- and supra-national levels of governance 
is absent from the nineteenth-century experiment. One often hears or reads the 
argument that the erosion of the nation-state occurs at the benefit of the other 
levels of governance, both infra and supra simultaneously.71 In contrast, the 
gold standard experiment in global finance points to a negative relation between 
local power and globalization. States with powerful subnational entities were 
the least able to take part in the global market. Globalization, where it occurred, 




























































































subnational governments are being more active again, not so much because they 
benefit from the erosion of national power, but because they are the first to 
suffer from it. With national governments cutting regional development 
programs, local governments are now locked into a suboptimal competition 
among one another for capital resources. Today's capital globalization, where 
and the extent to which it occurs, is more likely to undermine than to strengthen 
industrial districts and flexible specialization.
Another fashionable idea at the moment is that globalization compels banks all 
over the world to converge around the German universal model of banking.72 
Still, the exact opposite occurred in the nineteenth century. In universal 
banking, banks take a long-term interest in the form of loans or participation in 
firms. It is the reverse of specialized banking, in which deposit banks lend short, 
whereas smaller, highly-capitalized banks lend long. By the turn of the century, 
specialization, centralization, and globalization were mutually reinforcing 
trends, which eradicated universal banking in France and Britain. Only in 
financial systems where centralization and globalization were the least felt, that 
is, in most decentralized polities (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, 
Scandinavia), was universal banking able to persist. The present trend toward 
the take-over of security firms by huge commercial banks is probably less 
symptomatic of a deliberate move toward universality than the incidental effect 
of a trend toward banking concentration, concomitant with the current surge in 
global finance. In light of their increasing dependence on money-market 
funding, a liability that is even more volatile than deposits, today's large 
transnational commercial banks are even less likely to a take long-term interest 
in industry than their nineteenth-century forebears.73
Last, the present analysis challenges a staple idea of the current literature: "the 
low domestic political visibility of the issue of financial liberalization relative to 
that of trade liberalization."74 It is the idea that props up cognitive, normative, 
and epistemic explanations of current globalization.75 This case study suggests 
that financial liberalization, rather than being a non-visible idea, was an idea in 
the service of centralization, which could only carry the day in already- 
centralized polities. Political apathy with respect to financial issues, when it 
occurs, is no evidence of insurmountable technical complexity; an entrepreneur 
needs little expertise to understand that banking concentration, centralization, 
and extroversion, if not curbed, will sooner or later raise the cost of borrowed 
capital. The real issue is collective action, easier in decentralized than in 
centralized polities. Whether local districts still have the capacity nowadays to 
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18 Data on commercial and savings bank deposits are found, for Australia, in 
Mitchell 1983, 1992; and Butlin et al. 1971; and, for Denmark, Johansen 1985. 
Data on financial assets are found in Golsdmith 1969.
19 The liquidity problems arising from the greater importance taken by deposits 
in banks resources are underscored in Lamoreaux 1994, 107.
“ The terms bill o f exchange and overdraft are defined in note 14.
71 Cottrell 1980, 204.
22 Collins 1991,41.
“ Bouvier 1968, 221. See also Lévy-Leboyer 1976,462.
“ Bouvier 1968, 162; Lamoreaux 1994, 89.
25 Conti 1993, 311; Polsi 1996, 127; Riesser 1911, 306.
26 The Deutsche Bank was organized in 1870 by a group of private bankers to 
capture a greater share of the foreign short-term credit and payments business 
(Tilly 1991, 93). Broz argues that the Federal Reserve Bank was established to 
develop a market for acceptances in New York; Broz 1997.
22 On Britain, De Cecco 1974, 101 and Ziegler 1990, 135; on France, Bouvier 
1973, 160 and Lescure 1995, 318; on Belgium, Kauch 1950, pp. 235, 260.
“ Lamoreaux 1994, 144.
29 Kindleberger 1978, pp. 72-75.
“ Bouvier 1968; Cameron 1991, pp. 14-16.
31 The gold standard is viewed by Bordo and Kydland (1995) as a solution to the 
time-inconsistency problem analyzed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). In the 
initial story, a government with discretion over the formulation of monetary 




























































































employment. Absent a binding commitment, the public will come to anticipate 
the outcome, leading to an inflationary equilibrium. A solution to the dilemma 
is for the government to waive discretion and pledge to abide by a binding rule. 
A variation on that story, one that makes time inconsistency relevant to the gold 
standard runs like this: a government with discretion over its monetary and 
fiscal policy will have an incentive to borrow and then default on its debt 
through inflation or suspension of payments. Anticipating default, bond holders 
will either ask for a higher interest rate or not purchase government debt. A 
solution to the dilemma is for the government to commit to gold convertibility 
at a fixed rate—a transparent and simple rule (Bordo and Kydland 1995). Bordo 
and Schwartz (1994) found that those countries that adhered to the gold 
standard rule generally had lower fiscal deficits, more stable money growth, and 
lower inflation rates than those that did not.
52 Bordo and Rockoff 1995, 18.
J3De Cecco 1974, 52.
34 Martin-Acena 1994, 160.
33 Martin-Acena 1994, 144.
36 Bairoch 1976, 103.
37Green and Urquhart 1976, pp. 241 and 244.
“ Cameron 1991, 13.
39 Edelstein 1982, 138.
“ Bloomfield A. 1968, 4.
41 Dunning 1992, 116.
42 Edelstein 1982, 140.
43 Platt 1984, pp. 84, 92, 165, 176.
44 For pioneering work along these lines, see Gourevitch 1977.
“ Kennedy 1987; Bouvier 1968.































































































50 Flexible specialization has attracted a good deal of attention among economic 
historians, such as Piore and Sabel 1984, Sabel and Zeitlin 1985, Herrigel 1996, 
Deeg 1992, and the contributions to Bagnasco and Sabel 1995, and Sabel and 
Zeitlin 1997.
51 Platt 1984, 6.
52 Herrigel 1996.
53 Olson 1965.
“ Rokkan and Urwin 1983.
” Rokkan and Urwin 1983, 33.
“ Home 1947.
57 Vogler 1991; Chlepner 1926, 96.
58 Albrecht 1989, 62; M„rz 1984, 39; Deeg 1992, 77; Hansen, S. A. 1982, 590; 
Polsi 1993, pp. 234, 249.
39 A third set of hypotheses would bear on bank-firm (and bank-farm) relations, 
distant in centralized polities, closer in decentralized polities. The essentially 
qualitative nature of the literature on this point prevents us from pursuing it 
within the restricted format of this article. Only the first two hypotheses are 
tested against the historical record.
“ On Britain, Pressnell 1956, 285; Cottrell 1992; Horne 1947; Guinnane 1994; 
on France, Bouvier 1968; Gueslin 1992; Gueslin and Lescure 1995; on 
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1991, Albrecht 1990, 79; on Denmark, Hansen Per H. 1991 and Hansen S. A. 
1982; on Sweden, Nygren 1983; on Norway, Egge 1983; on Italy, Polsi 1993, 
1996.
62 Lamoreaux (1994) describes the New England extended district at the 




























































































engaged in financing investment. On Swiss banking, see Hartmann 1947 and 
Banziger 1985.
63 Egge 1983; Lange 1994.
64 No earlier data could be found. There is no reason to suspect, however, that 
the country ordering for 1929 would be significantly different from that for 
1913.
65 Although the 1880 benchmark was chosen because it is the earliest date for 
which data are available, the tax proportions and the relative ordering of 
countries do not significantly change throughout the 1880-1913 period in the 
case of European countries. Data for the dominions tend to display greater 
variations because of their late establishment.
66 The dominions differ from the other cases in that market institutions pre­
existed political institutions.
"Results hold when controlling for Goldsmith's (1969) "financial market 
depth"—the ratio of the assets of financial institutions to gross national product 
for 1913 (Verdier 1997).
68 For an argument that small economies are more dependent on world markets, 
see Katzenstein 1985.
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hypothesis; Rogowski 1989, 27.
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capita figure behind Britain), Cameron (1991, pp. 12-13) warns that "[b]y the 
beginning of the twentieth century Switzerland had apparently recovered its 
position as a capital exporter, but that is by no means certain; because of its 
geographical and political position, Switzerland became a favorite site for the 
location of international holding companies, especially in the electrical industry, 




























































































71 This claim is present in the flexible specialization literature (Sabel 1989; 
Herrigel 1996, 275), the European integration literature (neofunctionalism at 
large and also Du Granrut 1994, Ansel forth.), and the globalization literature 
(Cemy 1995, 623).
12 Universality is presently a theme with much theoretical and empirical support. 
The economic literature, much kindled by the successive U.S. Congressional 
attempts, so far in vain, to allow universal banking in the United States, justifies 
universal banking by the presence of asymmetric information in investment 
markets. In Europe, the Second Banking Directive as implemented on 1st 
January 1993, established a single, unionwide banking license permitting 
universal banking. The market trend, in Europe, has been toward the creation 
of financial service conglomerates providing an extensive range of services.
"For more on this, Vitols 1995.
14 Helleiner 1994, 203.
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T A B L E  1
Potential Winners and Losers from an Eventual Centralization 
and Internationalization of Capital Flows
WINNERS LOSERS
CREDITOR savers small- and medium-sized firms
COUNTRY center banks farms
DEBTOR center banks savers
COUNTRY large firms small- and medium-sized firms 
farms




























































































T A B L E  2









Canada 4 5 91 0
U.K. 5 15 80 0
Spain 33 0 67 0
France 0 34 66 0
Australia 34 1 65 0
Sweden 35 2 63 0
the Netherlands 17 24 59 0
Belgium 1 40 59 0
New Zealand 4 38 58 0
Norway 51 0 49 0
U.S. 21h 0b 40b 39b
Austria-Hyngary 58‘ 5' 37' O1
Germany 71 1 28 0
Italy 40 33 27 0
Denmark 75 0 25 0
Switzerland 27 0 22 51
* savings banks, mutua! credit societies, mortgage banks. 
b postal savings; savings banks in France and Belgium. 
c commercial banks regulated by the central government.
d commercial banks regulated by local governments (State banks in US; local and 





























































































> Austria and the Czech Lands.
Sources: Australia: Butlin, Hall and White, 1971, 114, 503, 525; Austria-Hungary: 
Mitchell 1992, 774, 781; Belgium: Société des nations 1931, 116, Mitchell 1992, 781, 
784; Britain: Société des nations 1931, 260; Canada: Société des nations 1931, 329; 
Denmark: Société des nations 1931, 125; France: Mitchell 1992, 774, 782; Germany: 
Deutsche Bundesbank 1976, 57, 63, 65, 76, 102, 112, 120; Italy: Mitchell 1992, 774, 
782, Société des nations 1931, 187; the Netherlands: Nederlandsche Bank 1987, 34, 
48, 52; New Zealand: Société des nations 1931, 447; Norway: Société des nations 
1931, 199, Mitchell 1992, 782; Spain: Martin-Acena 1995, 522, Mitchell 1992 , 782; 
Sweden: Société des nations 1931, 275, Mitchell 1992, 783; Switzerland: Ritzmann 





























































































T A B L E  3













Note: The numerator is the number of commercial banks. The denominator is the 
number of commercial banks and commercial bank branches. A higher ratio 
means a higher occurrence of unit banking. In contrast, a lower ratio reflects a 
greater occurrence of branch banking.





























































































T A B L E  4
Capital Market Fragmentation as a Negative Function of Political Centralization
Dependent Variablerioca/ Banking 1913 Unit-banking ratio 1929
expected I II
sign
intercept +/- 1.10 0.40
Tax proxy - -0.01 -0.004
(-4.42)*** (-2.09)* 
Dominion (dummy) +/- -0.37 -0.20
(-3.12)*** (-2.57)*
corrected R- 0.62 0.40
number of cases 15* 12»
Note: * = Significant at 10 percent level. ** = Significant at 5 percent level. *** = 
Significant at 1 percent level. Values of r-statistics are given in parentheses.
* Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States. 
b Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United States.
Sources. Local Banking 1913: the sum of the first and fourth columns of Table 2. Unit 
banking: Table 3. Tax proxy: central government taxes as percentage of general 
government taxes circa 1880; for Western Europe, excluding Spain, Flora (1983, 273); 
data for Austria-Hungary could not be used, for excluding the non-Austrian part of the 
Empire; for Spain, Bemis (1919, 338, 347); for the United States, U.S. Bureau of the 
Census (1975, 1119); for Canada, Canada, Department of Agriculture (1890, 104, 
117); data for Australia are for 1907 (Mitchell 1983, 802; Commonwealth Bureau of 





























































































Long-Term Foreign Investment Stocks 1914 (in 1914 US$)
outflows (+), inflows (-)
per capita divided by GNP















Note: All data are gross foreign investments as of 1914, except in the case of the 
United States, the only country with known significant two-way flows, for which 
data are net.
Sources: Foreign investment stocks in 1914 U.S. dollars were found in Cameron 
1991, 13, except for Sweden and Norway, for which the data were found in 
Bloomfield A. (1968, 43-44) and converted in U.S. dollars at the old gold parity 
of 0.2680 krone to the dollar (Svennilson 1954, 318). Data used in the computa­
tion of stocks for Sweden and Norway only start in 1861 and 1871 respectively, 




























































































estimating Norwegian liability. Population data are from Maddison (1991, 232- 
35). GNP data are for 1913: 1913 GNP data in current prices (Mitchell 1983, 
1992; for Austria-Hungary, Komlos 1990, 126) were converted in U.S. dollars 




























































































Cross-Border Capital Investments as a Negative Function 
of Capital Market Fragmentation
T A B L E  6
Dependent Variable:/l£w/we value o f foreign investment /CNP as o f 1913-14
expected I II III IV
sign
intercept +/- 1.23 1.40 1.25 -0.54
Local banking 1913 - -0.84 -1.73
(-1.41) (-4.27)***
Unit banking 1929 - -2.33
(-2.18)*
Tax proxy + 0.02
(3.46)***
Dominion {dummy) +/- 0.69
(2.22)*
corrected R2 0.07 0.59 0.29 0.51
number of cases 14» 13b 10» i2d
Note: * = Significant at 10 percent level. ** = Significant at 5 percent level. *** = 
Significant at 1 percent level. Values of /’-statistics are given in parentheses.
* Australia, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States. 
b Australia, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 




























































































0 Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, 
the United States.
d Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, the United States.
Sources: Foreign investment/GNP: see Table 5. Local banking 1913: see Table 2. 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































Sources: Bairoch Index of Per Capita Industrialization (Rogowski 1989, p. 29). Long- 
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